Introduction
Logicism is typically de ned as the thesis that mathematics reduces to or is an ex- His initial plan was to carry out the actual deductions symbolically in a second volume and recruited his Cambridge colleague and former teacher A N Whitehead as a co-author By the time their technical work was ready for publication it had grown so large and their views had changed so signi cantly in response to certain paradoxes (see section below) that they decided to rename their work Principia
Early drafts of his work on this subject can be found in Papers and Papers See Hylton ( ) and Gri n ( ) for discussion of Russell's philosophical conversion to realism See Proops ( ) for an account of the philosophical motivations behind Russell's initial acceptance of logicism to (A proposed fourth volume which was to be Whitehead's responsibility primarily was never produced ) Russell later describes the process as having been exhausting and students are now required to learn While it is not widely accepted today that PM in fact succeeded in establishing logicism I think a case that it did can still be made
The Regressive Method and Its Prior Successes
According to Russell progress in mathematics can proceed in either of two directions (IMP -) Most research proceeds in the "forward" or "constructive" direction in which new results are proven from previously known ndings In this way one attains the results of newer more complex and "higher" mathematics Russell saw his own work however as proceeding in a di erent direction employing an "regressive" or "analytic" method Here one begins with a body of knowledge already accepted as at least mostly true The goal is to work backwards from these known results to a deductive basis for them a set of principles more general less complex and employing a smaller unde ned vocabulary If it can be shown that the original body of knowledge-or at least all of it deemed worth preserving-can be deductively recovered from this more austere basis we gain insight into the real nature of the truths Logical connections between the terms employed are revealed The new basis might also remove puzzling or unwanted aspects of the original theory According to Russell's story a number of late th century mathematicians including Dedekind Weierstrass and the members of Giuseppe Peano's Italian school had succeeded in "arithmetizing" most of pure arithmetic and even many areas of pure geometry That is they showed how it is that these areas of mathematics could be deductively recovered starting only with the basic principles governing natural numbers Moreover Peano and his associates had made further "regressive" progress in number theory by reducing its basis to ve principles now known as the
Peano-Dedekind axioms
Zero is a natural number
It is worth comparing Russell's description of philosophical progress in the study of mathematics with his overall description of "analysis" as a method employed in other areas of philosophy see e g Hager ( ) for discussion
No two natural numbers have the same successor Whatever holds of zero and always holds of the successor of any natural number of which it holds holds of all natural numbers (The principle of mathematical induction )
At the time it was widely believed that all of pure arithmetic could be derived from these principles together with the usual assumptions of logic and set or class-theory (and even today it is generally agreed that no axiomatic system for number theory represents an improvement on this)
However according to Russell the work of Peano's school had not completed the backwards journey to the basic principles of mathematics because an even more minimal basis is possible Russell portrays Frege as having taken the next step in this direction by showing how what amount to Peano's "axioms" for number theory could be derived from logical axioms removing the need for any basic assumptions beyond the purely logical Achieving this next step required rst a way of de ning the non-logical terminology used in Peano's postulates "zero" "successor" and "natural number" There are in fact di erent ways of de ning these but let us rst focus on natural numbers considered as cardinal numbers Taking Frege's talk of "extensions of concepts" in his Grundgesetze as interchangeable with talk of "classes" Frege de ned the cardinal number of class α as the class of all classes whose members could be put in -correspondence with the members of α Zero could then be de ned as the cardinal number of the null class The relation of successor could be de ned as holding between n and m when there is a class α and member of that class x such that n is the number of α and m is the number of the class consisting of all members of α except x In that case the members of n are all those containing one more member than contained in members of m The natural numbers could be de ned as all those (cardinal) numbers following zero in the series created by the successor relation zero zero's successor ( ) zero's successor's successor ( ) and so on (Frege -cf Frege -) In particular n is a natural number when it has every property possessed by and always passed from something having it to that something's successor Frege also provided an axiomatic system for logic including principles governing classes in which Peano's "axioms" interpreted using these de nitions could be derived as theorems
Frege's proposed basis for arithmetic although fully logicist (in not employing any speci cally non-logical vocabulary or non-logical principles) and clearly more Russell mentioned these problems in POM and made certain suggestions in the direction of solving some of them but even by his own admission he needed to do more work to provide a complete solution before the formal project of PM could Many of his attempts are fascinating and still worthy of further study but they cannot be discussed in detail here
Central to the solution Russell settled on for PM was the suggestion that many apparent "abstract" entities such as classes and propositions are not genuine entities at all but only "logical constructions" or "logical ctions" Apparent terms for them are not genuine terms but "incomplete symbols" meaningful not by naming entities but rather contributing to the meaning of statements in which they appear in a more complicated way PM * o ered the following contextual de nition of a class abstract "ẑ . . . z . . . " for a class of individuals
(A similar contextual de nition * was given for class abstracts for classes of classes ) Roughly to say something f about the classẑ(ψz) is really to say that there is a (predicative-see below) property φ coextensive with ψ of which f holds It or higher types-so called "predicative" propositional functions-from those which do quantify over predicative functions of the same type and those which quantify over those and so on This is known as Russell's "rami ed" hierarchy There is some disagreement over how and to what extent this hierarchy is fully enshrined in the logic of PM itself However Russell found it necessary to add an assumption
In particular Landini ( chap b chap ) has argued that PM should be interpreted to make use of no object-language variables except predicate variables making the syntactic rules the "axiom of reducibility" (* ) according to which every monadic propositional function φ is equivalent to a predicative one f marking predicative ones with an exclamation point ! (as well as similar principles for higher types and two-argument functions)
Notice that the quanti ed φ in Russell's contextual de nition of classes above is restricted to predicative values If the function ψ were not equivalent to a predicative φ then according to this de nition all statements f {ẑ(ψz)} about the classẑ(ψz) would come out as false Thus Russell took assuming the axiom of reducibility to be a necessity for recapturing an adequate class theory and sometimes also called it "the axiom of classes" (Papers )
Logicism in Principia Mathematica
The no classes theory of classes and PM 's similar treatment of "relations in extension" (* ) greatly simpli ed its syntactic primitives and reduced its basic assumptions In fact the only signs taken as primitive in PM are two statement operators "∼" (negation) "∨" (disjunction) the universal and existential quanti ers and variables of the various logical types Other truth-functional statement operators are de ned from negation and disjunction in the usual ways For instance material implication p ⊃ q is de ned as ∼p∨q The axioms of the system apart from the various forms of the axiom of reducibility mentioned above include only those for standard classical propositional and (higher-order) quanti er logic From this basis alone much simpler than what is suggested by the traditional interpretation found in e g Church ( ) where variables of in nitely many orders within the same type are possible Landini reads the nonpredicative variable φ occurring in the axiom of reducibility as a metalinguistic schematic letter Strictly speaking PM o ers us two di erent treatments of the logic of quanti cation one in * and one in * with the more austere * disallowing quanti ers subordinate to truth-functional operators except as abbreviation For the sake of simplicity I pass over such complications here derive the laws governing them (There are two other principles sometimes misleadingly called "axioms" in the discussions of Russell's logicism viz the "axiom of in nity" and the "multiplicative axiom" more on these below ) Russell's treatment of cardinal numbers is very similar to Frege's with the substitution of the no classes theory of classes for Frege's naïve theory of extensions the main point of departure Cardinal numbers are treated as classes of classes alike in size i e which can be put in -correspondence with each other The number is then the class of all empty classes of which there is of course only one (the null class) The number is the class of all single-membered classes the number the class of all couples and so on One caveat introduced by Russell's type distinctions and its consequences for the no classes theory is that numbers are duplicated across various types For example the null class of individuals must be treated differently in the no classes theory from the null class of classes of individuals and consequently the "zero" which contains only the former is in a di erent type from the "zero" containing only the latter In the summary of the formal treatment below variables such as x y and z are used for individuals Greek letters such as α β etc as special variables for classes (eliminable in favor of propositional function variables on the no classes theory) variables R S etc for relations in extension (also eliminable) however de nitions for higher-type analogues of these concepts would be quite similar identity
I here try to make use of Whitehead and Russell's own notation as much as possible although note that they used a dot or concatenation rather than "&" for conjunction and also used dots in place of parentheses for grouping see PM -I also here omit certain intermediately de ned signs employed in PM itself and simply write the unabbreviated forms where these are used later
class of one-many relations
class of one-one relations
class of cardinal numbers
class of natural numbers
Notice here that the successor of a number α is the class of classes which are such that if a member is removed one gets a member of α the class of all classes with one more member than the members of α The class of natural numbers are those contained in all classes containing and the successor of anything they contain and hence would be the class containing exactly Using these de nitions formal versions of the Peano-Dedekind axioms could be stated as follows
Using nothing beyond the usual assumptions of higher-order quanti er logic (which also provide a proxy for class-logic via the no classes theory) four of these ve can be derived as theorems relatively straightforwardly (An interested reader may consult PM parts I-II for details )
The problematic one of the bunch is the fourth which states that no two natural numbers have the same successor In order for this to hold no natural number can be empty i e for every natural number there must be at least one class with that many things Notice further that in order for this to be true for every natural number the number of things in total must be in nite Suppose instead that there were only give formal logical de nitions of such notions as limit and continuity Part VI goes
In IMP (chap ) Russell de nes real numbers simply as segments of ratios or rational numbers according to the "Dedekind cut" method and does little to explain the more general application of PM 's theory of quantity this oversimpli cation of the more general treatment provided in PM has been bemoaned by Gandon ( ) among others further yet and generalizes on these notions to provide a generic theory of quantity and measurement The planned fourth volume of PM was slated to provide logicist accounts of many aspects of pure geometry as well though one can glean certain aspects of how this might have proceeded from Russell's chapters on projective metric and descriptive geometry making up the later parts of his earlier POM
Gödel's Results and the Scope of Logicism
We now turn to evaluation of Russell's logicism Perhaps the most common problem one hears cited against it or logicism in general especially in casual conversation appeals to Gödel's famous incompleteness results However I think the relevance of these results for assessing logicism at least on the most reasonable understandings of the logicist thesis is greatly exaggerated
Using PM as an example Gödel showed that any deductive system for mathematics having certain features contains undecidable sentences i e sentences such that neither they nor their negations can be derived as theorems Especially when combined with well-known corollaries shown by Rosser Tarski and others the features can for all intents and purposes be reduced to consistency having the requisite strength to capture basic elements of number theory and having a recursive axiomatization Since recursive functions have been shown equivalent with Turingcomputable functions and λ-de nable functions if we accept the Church-Turing thesis that these and only these functions are e ectively computable having a recursive axiomatization amounts more or less to there existing an e ective decision
procedure for determining what does or does not count as a deduction in this sysIt is likely that Gödel's exposition of PM was not entirely faithful to the original in particular Gödel did not fully take into account that numerals as signs for classes in PM were incomplete symbols and not genuine terms This issue and the complications arising from it cannot be explored in depth without providing a full reconstruction of PM which cannot be attempted here Gödel's original results were published in Gödel ( ) and a summary of them and the most important corollaries can be found in most textbooks on mathematical logic e g Mendelson ( ) tell what counts as a deduction in it and what doesn't? Gödel's " rst incompleteness theorem" roughly establishes that systems with the desirable features must contain an undecidable sentence abbreviated G which roughly asserts of itself that it is not a theorem of the system (or really asserts something analogous of a number which corresponds to it in an arithmetization of the system's syntax) Clearly it would be undesirable for G to be a theorem as then one would have a false theorem in the system But if it is not a theorem it is true and hence we have what appears to be a number-theoretic truth not derivable from the axioms Gödel's "second incompleteness theorem" establishes that in such systems one can form a sentence which roughly asserts that the system is consistent i e that no contradiction is derivable within but that this sentence is also undecidable at least if the system is consistent How relevant such results are for evaluating Russell's (or anyone else's) form of logicism depends largely on how strong we take the logicist thesis to be Suppose we de ne a "purely logical deductive system" as one whose axioms are all logical truths and whose inference rules are sound on logical grounds alone and so cannot lead from a logical truth or truths to something that isn't also a logical truth A very strong interpretation of the logicist thesis (LT) would be the following There is a practical purely logical deductive system S such that for every mathematical truth p p is a theorem of S (LT-a)
It is likely that Russell believed that (LT-a) was true early on and that PM was such a deductive system However even if we interpret the "practical" in (LT-a) to restrict us to recursively axiomatized systems additional assumptions would be required to argue that the Gödel results undermine (LT-a) Russell was aware even in that there were undecidable sentences in PM The (so-called) axiom of in nity for example is neither derivable nor refutable therein Russell would not have taken this to undermine his main thesis or even (LT-a) since he would regard neither the axiom of in nity nor its negation as a "mathematical truth" if it is true it is contingently true (IMP ) Unless it could be shown that some of the undecidable sentences proven to exist by Gödel or their negations are mathematically true there is no problem Russell even suggested a response along these lines in when asked about the importance of Gödels results in a letter Unfortunately as such the response seems a bit hasty Gödel's G and the consistency of PM itself unlike the axiom of in nity (arguably) we do seem to know to be true and on a priori grounds ) Russell suggests that Kant was wrong not about mathematics but about logic alleging that even logical truths can be understood as synthetic a priori in Kant's sense Later on Russell claims instead that logicism shows that mathematics is analytic and not synthetic (e g HWP ) It is likely however that the di erent attitudes are as much the result of employing di erent de nitions of "analytic" and "synthetic" as they are a re ection of a change of mindset see Landini ( b -) and Korhonen ( chap ) without saying exactly what it is that makes logical truth special an issue Russell himself struggled with Early on he seems to have thought that any truth which could be stated using only logical constants counts as a "logical truth" (PM )
later on however he suggests that they must have a special "tautological" form but neglects to provide an exact speci cation of what that amounts to (IMP )
In contemporary research in metalogic it is often the case that two distinct criteria are given for what makes formulas logically necessary a deductive or prooftheoretic one (derivability from the axioms) and a semantic one (usually amounting to something like truth in all acceptable models or interpretations) If a deductive system is both sound and complete the two characterizations are equivalent something is a logical truth in one sense if and only if it is in the other However some deductive systems are incomplete For example it is a well-known corollary of Gödel's results that second-and higher-order logical calculi (including PM ) when interpreted according to "standard semantics" cannot be complete when axiomatized recursively There are formulas that are logically true according to the semantic criterion that cannot be derived as theorems Obviously this result should not be interpreted as showing that some logical truths are not logical truths and similarly it is unclear why the fact that certain apparently "mathematical" truths cannot be derived in a certain deductive calculus should be taken to establish that those truths are not logical truths In other words if the logicist thesis were interpreted along the lines of (LT-b) below then it is not clear how or why Gödel's results should be For further discussion see Klement ( ) Standard semantics is often contrasted with "general" or "Henkin" semantics the former unlike the latter requires that every subset of the domain of the rst-order quanti ers be the extension of some value of the domain of quanti cation for second-order variables and similarly for other types Rayo ( ) provides a list of di erent interpretations of logicism though curiously he does not bother to make distinctions similar to my (LT-a) and (LT-c) for forms focused on deductive consequence or derivability This is much like (LT-a) except that it does not require there to be a single logical system in which every mathematical truth is captured it requires only that each such truth be captured in some such system or other To my knowledge there is nothing in Gödel's results to suggest that (LT-c) must be false Consider again the situation that we seem to know that Gödel's G is true despite its undecidability in PM So long as our knowledge of this relies only on logical principles perhaps there is some purely logical extension of PM in which G is derivable (And if our knowledge of G requires something beyond logic for this to pose a problem for Russell it would need to be shown that it doesn't require anything beyond mathematics or his earlier response is su cient ) If this new system is recursive it too will have undecidable (true) sentences but perhaps they are derivable in another logical system of the appropriate type This is more or less in keeping with Russell's "o cial" response to For what it is worth Russell himself admitted that the truth of the axiom of reducibility was less than fully obvious Indeed even when rst stating it he admitted that the grounds for accepting it were "inductive" in keeping with his general "regressive" method It could be used as a premise from which many desirable results could be proven and he knew of no more plausible or no more general principle from which as many important results followed (PM ) Russell also dedicated much of the new material added to the second edition of PM to exploring a less than fully successful attempt to do away with the axiom by adopting instead a doctrine of extensionality he took to be motivated by the philosophical treaties of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus (see PM xiv and appendices) However it should be remembered that Russell's main motivation for adopting the axiom was to recover the ability to speak of classes which for him amounted simply to things considered in groups or plurally without a stronger assumption of "real" classes taken as genuine things It is now widely acknowledged that something like quanti cation over collections or pluralities or in general what one nds in a "standard" higher-order logic is necessary for capturing some logical forms used in every-day reasoning Perhaps the most famous example is the Kaplan-Geach sentence "some critics only admire one another" which cannot be interpreted in rst-order logic The history of logic does have its rst-order purists like Quine who considered higher-order logic to be "settheory in sheep's clothing" (Quine ) and there are even hold-outs among contemporary philosophers (e g Burgess -) Still I think it safe to say that these represent the minority Something like the ability to consider objects in groups seems to be a necessary central element in reasoning about nearly every topic and allowing for this is not to take on a special extra-logical or speci cally mathematical assumption Russell's axiom of reducibility is if anything no stronger and arguably weaker than adopting the usual comprehension principles allowed in simple type theory or most plural logics (cf Yi ) The ideal formulation of a
The di culties with the attempt were partly appreciated by Russell himself partly not For further discussion see Landini ( ) Hazen and Davoren ( ) Landini ( ) and Linsky ( ) For more on Russell's attitude about the relationship between discourse about classes and about plurals see Oliver and Smiley ( ) Bostock ( ) and Klement ( ) Indeed if Landini is right that the object-language variables of PM are only predicative variables (see note above) then system PM is formally speaking the same as a simple type theory and the axiom of reducibility just is its comprehension principle see Landini ( -) logical apparatus that allows us to speak of classes or collections or pluralities remains an active area of research discussion and controversy but when compared to the alternatives Russell's adoption of something like the axiom of reducibility seems all-things-considered to be among the most restrained
The failure to prove the multiplicative axiom or obtain its results outright in PM also does not seem to pose a serious problem for the success of Russell's logicism
While the very similar axiom of choice is perhaps widely accepted among mathematicians and it is also known to be equivalent to a number of other principles with a similar status (the well-ordering principle Zorn's lemma the multiplicative axiom itself etc ) no one has been able to provide a proof of it from more obvious or more fundamental principles and indeed it is well-known to be independent of the other axioms of ZF set theory The multiplicative axiom is not needed for 
